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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0397

INFO JOINT STAFF WASHDC

SECDEF WASHDC

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC

UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY DAKAR

AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA

AMEMBASSY KIGALI

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

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WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, RW, UNSC, SUBJECT: RWANDA: 11/1 MEETING WITH THE UN

- 1. CONFIDENTIAL. ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. SUMMARY. ON 11/1 A US INTERAGENCY TEAM MET WITH UN U/SYGS ANNAN, GOULDING, AND HANSEN TO DISCUSS PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING THE SECURITY AND REPATRIATION PROBLEM IN THE RWANDA REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE. ANNAN SEEMED RECEPTIVE TO THE USG PROPOSAL, BUT DID NOT COMMIT THE UN TO ANY PARTICULAR OPTION. THE UN SUPPORTS A ROBUST CHAPTER VI OPERATION OF 1-2 BATTALIONS THAT WILL PROVIDE SECURITY IN THE ZAIRIAN CAMPS, BUT WILL NOT SEPARATE SOLDIERS AND OFFICIALS. THE OPTIONS UNDER DISCUSSION RANGED FROM THE USG "BUBBLE" CONCEPT (A TIME LIMITED INTENSIVE SECURITY OPERATION) TO SECURING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND TRAINING ZAIRIAN AND HUTU POLICE. THE OPTIONS ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.
- 3. THE SYG REPORT IS DUE WITHIN TWO WEEKS. REQUEST A FORMAL USG POSITION SO THAT USUN CAN BEGIN LOBBYING MEMBER STATES ON OUR PREFERRED OPTION. END SUMMARY.
- 4. ON 11/1 RICHARD CLARKE, NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 USUN N 04752 01 OF 03 040250Z GLOBAL AFFAIRS, LED AN INTERAGENCY TEAM TO MEET WITH THE UN ON SECURITY AND REPATRIATION IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS. CLARKE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY USUN AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH AND INTERAGENCY REPRESENTATIVES. THEY MET WITH U/SYGS ANNAN, GOULDING AND HANSEN.

UN OPTIONS

- 5. U/SYG ANNAN OUTLINED FIVE OPTIONS THAT THE UN IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING:
- 6. SEPARATION AND REMOVAL. AN AMBITOUS CH VII OPERATION THAT WOULD DEPLOY ONE SMALL DIVISION TO ZAIRIAN CAMPS TO SEPARATE AND MOVE RWANDAN SOLDIERS, MILITIA AND FORMER GOVERNMENT LEADERS. THIS WAS VIEWED BY ALL, INCLUDING THE UN, AS UNREALISTIC IN SIZE AND SCOPE. HOWEVER, IT MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE UPCOMING SYG REPORT FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES.
- 7. TRAIN ZAIRE. A CH VI OPERATION TO TRAIN, SUPERVISE, MONITOR AND EQUIP ZAIRIAN FORCES TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN THE CAMPS.
- 8. TRAIN ZAIRE BI-LATERALLY. UNHOR HAS PROPOSED A SIMILAR OPERATION, BUT THE POLICE TRAINERS/MONITORS WOULD BE PROVIDED ON A BI-LATERAL ASSISTANCE BASIS DIRECTLY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE--AND ORGANIZED CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 04 USUN N 04752 01 OF 03 040250Z BY UNHCR. IN UNHCR'S SCHEME, THE TRAINERS/MONITORS WOULD ALSO OPERATE ALONE SIDE ZAIRLAN FORCES.

- 9. TRAIN HUTUS. IDENTIFY "NOT-SO-DIRTY" HUTU FORCES IN THE CAMPS AND TRAIN THEM TO PROVIDE SECURITY. ACCORDING TO ANNAN, THE RPA HAS BEEN RECEPTIVE TO THIS PROPOSAL.
- 10. HUMANITARIAN SECURITY. A CH VI OPERATION TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN ZAIRIAN CAMPS.
- 11. THESE OPTIONS ARE NOT NECESSARILY MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. THE BOTTOM LINE FOR ANY OPTION, ACCORDING TO ANNAN, IS TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN THE CAMPS, ASSURE SAFE CROSSING POINTS, AND CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR RETURN INSIDE RWANDA. ON THIS LAST POINT, ANNAN REEMPHASIZED THE GOR'S INCREASING FRUSTRATION THAT THE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS

EXPENDING ITS TIME AND RESOURCES ON THE REFUGEES -- MANY OF WHOM ARE THE PERPETRATORS OF

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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0398 INFO JOINT STAFF WASHDC SECDEF WASHDC WHITEHOUSE WASHDC UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY KINSHASA AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA USMISSION GENEVA

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TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, RW, UNSC, SUBJECT: RWANDA: 11/1 MEETING WITH THE UN

GENOCIDE--RATHER THAN THE GOVERNMENT AND THOSE INSIDE RWANDA. GEN BARIL RAISED THE EXAMPLE OF TUESDAY'S INCIDENT WITH THE AUSTRALIAN FORCE, AND KAGAME'S SUBSEQUENT RESTRICTION ON APC'S, AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE DETERIORATING SITUATION INSIDE RWANDA.

US RESPONSE AND OPTION

12. CLARKE BRIEFLY RESPONDED TO THE UN'S PROPOSALS AND COMMENTS. AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF ANY SOLUTION MUST BE INCREASING THE GOVERNMENT'S RESOURCES AND STRENGTHENING GOVERNMENT AND ARMY INTEGRATION. CLARKE AGREED WITH ANNAN'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SEPARATION OPTION--IT WAS NOT REALISTIC. HE WAS ALSO SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE ABILITY TO TRAIN ZAIRIAN FORCES QUICKLY. REGARDING CH VI VS. CH VII--THE USG COULD SUPPORT EITHER ONE. THE BOTTOM LINE IS RECRUITING--WILL POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS BE MORE LIKELY TO VOLUNTEER FORCES FOR A CHVI OR CHVII OPERATION?

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- PAGE 03 USUN N 04752 02 OF 03 040250Z 13. CLARKE PRESENTED A TWO PART US PROPOSAL FOR AN EXPANDED UNAMIR: 1) 1 BN WOULD PROVIDE DAYTIME SECURITY FOR RELIEF OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATORS IN THE ZAIRIAN CAMPS; 2) ANOTHER BN WOULD PROVIDE AN INTENSIVE 24 HOUR SECURITY "BUBBLE" IN ONE CAMP AT A TIME--FOR A PERIOD OF ONE MONTH--TO ALLOW A BRIEF BUT SECURE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFUGEES TO RETURN.
- 14. US ASSISTANCE WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF HIGH LEVEL HELP IN RECRUITING TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, HELP IN PLANNING, EQUIPMENT UNDER 607, AND PERHAPS LIFT.
- 15. ANNAN AND GOULDING WERE CONCERNED THAT IT MIGHT PUT THE UN IN AN UNTENABLE POSITION IF CROSS-BORDER FIGHTING BROKE OUT; THAT THE CAMPS MIGHT BE IN THE SAME INSECURE STATE ONCE THE BUBBLE MOVED ON; AND THAT IT WOULD BE HARD TO RECRUIT FORCES TO TAKE ON INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS. HANSEN ASKED ABOUT NORTHERN BURUNDI.
- 16. CLARKE SAID THAT THE UN WAS ALREADY IN AN UNTENABLE POSITION INSIDE RWANDA. HE AND JCS REP COL BALTIMORE EXPLAINED THAT THE BUBBLE CONCEPT WAS DESIGNED TO GIVE REFUGEES THE SECURITY TO LEAVE ZAIRE WITHOUT BEING THREATENED--AND THAT THE BRIEF ONE TIME OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO WITH SECURITY SHOULD ENCOURAGE REPATRIATION. MOREOVER, IT MIGHT BE EASIER TO RECRUIT TROOP CONTRIBUTORS IF THEY WERE SIGNING UP TO A TIME LIMITED OPERATION.

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- PAGE 04 USUN N 04752 02 OF 03 040250Z 17. INDERFURTH AND ANNAN AGREED THAT BURUNDI WOULD NOT ACCEPT A PEACEKEEPING FORCE AND IT MIGHT PROVE DESTABILIZING. ALL AGREED, AS WELL, THAT TANZANIA COULD SECURE ITS OWN REFUGEE CAMPS IF GIVEN THE NECESSARY MATERIAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT.
- 18. ANNAN EMPHASIZED THAT SOME MINIMAL SECURITY STRUCTURE MUST BE LEFT BEHIND IF THE "BUBBLE" DID NOT SUCEED IN ENCOURAGING REPATRIATION. ANNAN AND CLARKE AGREED THAT ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE TO HIRE CONTRACTORS TO TRAIN LOCALS FOR SECURITY. IN ANY CASE, BOTH AGREED THAT ZAIRIAN FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION IN SOME WAY IN ORDER TO SECURE THEIR COOPERATION.

CONCLUSIONS ----**---**

19. ANNAN SEEMED RECEPTIVE TO THE "BUBBLE" CONCEPT, BUT HE DID NOT COMMIT TO A PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION. HOWEVER, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE

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UN WANTS A ROBUST CH VI OPERATION OF 1-2 BATTALIONS THAT MIGHT COMBINE MANY OF THE OPTIONS ABOVE. ANY

OPERATION WOULD INCLUDE A TRAINING COMPONENT.

- 20. DPKO WILL SEND A REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS WITH A RANGE OF OPTIONS (BUT REPORTEDLY, NOT BEFORE THE SYG MEETS WITH SRSG KHAN IN GENEVA ON NOV 9TH). MEANWHILE, THE UN WILL BEGIN TO FEEL OUT POTENTIAL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS. AFTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSES AN OPTION, OR PROVIDES FEEDBACK, DPKO WILL BE IN A POSITION TO DRAW UP A MORE DETAILED PLAN OF ACTION.
- 21. ACTION REQUEST: WE NEED A FORMAL GOVERNMENT POSITION ON A UN OPERATION IN ZAIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AT THE LATEST, WE NEED A POSITION FOR THE OPENING ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IF WE HAVE AN EARLIER DECISION, WE WILL BE ABLE TO LOBBY MEMBER STATES IN ADVANCE OF THE REPORT. THIS WILL GIVE US A BETTER CHANCE OF ACHIEVING OUR PREFERRED OPTION AND REACHING A SPEEDY SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION.
- 22. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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